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ATTRIBUTION AND INFERENCE
IN THE INTERPRETATION OF CANDID
AND STAGED FILM EVENTS
PAUL MESSARIS
MICHAEL PALLENIK
The two experiments described in this paper deal with the
following question: What difference does a viewer's
assessment of the degree of control exercised in the
production of a film or videotape make in the way a viewer
will interpret the events portrayed? By "control" we mean
the assessment by the viewer that the filmmaker or TV
producer does something deliberately, with the express
purpose of implying something to his audience. In our
conclusions we shall discuss what difference these ways of
interpreting will make to our understanding of how we deal
with real and symbolic worlds.
There are varying degrees to which control can enter into
the process of film or TV production. Most fiction films and
TV dramas represent one extreme along this spectrum.
Actors, costumes, and settings are chosen deliberately, the
action is scripted, camera positions and movements are
predetermined, and editing conforms to a plan. In short,
control is as complete and all-encompassing as possible, and
it is exercised in order to communicate a specific story,
moral, or observation.
On the other hand, there are many instances in which the
person responsible for the production of a film (or TV
program, or videotape) exercises less control over the
process. One example might be the researcher recording data
of "behavior" for further study. An extreme example might
be the television tapes that are produced by surveillance
cameras in banks. The security agencies which produce these
tapes have almost no influence on the content of the final
product. Although they set up the camera in a certain
position and they determine when it will be on or off, what
ends up being recorded by their camera is not of their
making. These videotapes may be taken as examples of
minimal control.
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Let us return, now, to the question with which this paper
opened: How are viewers' interpretations affected by the
degree of "perceived" control that went into the making of a
film, videotape, etc.? More precisely, how, if at all, do
viewers' interpretations take account of the degree of control
which they believe to have been exercised? As a hypothetical
case, assume that a viewer is confronted with a number of
video tapes made in a bank with the kind of surveillance
camera mentioned above. The viewer picks five minutes' of
tape to look at, and then we ask him to interpret what he
saw. Since he knows the circumstances under which the tapes
were made, i.e., since he knows that no director or
script-writer has staged what he is looking at, we should
expect him to use his knowledge of "real life" in making his
interpretations. In other words, this hypothetical viewer
might reasonably be expected to draw upon his own
experience with banks, together with his beliefs about human
behavior, in forming opinions about the type of bank shown
in the tape, its probable location, the probable backgrounds
anc personality characteristics of the various customers, and
the like.
Now, assume that we take the same five-minute piece of
tape and show it to a different viewer. This time, however,
we attach a title and a list of credits at the beginning of the
video tape, and we tell this viewer that what he is seeing is
the beginning of a telemovie. Under··these circumstances, we
would expect his interpretations to be made in a different
way. If he believes us and treats what he sees as a deliberately
staged piece of action, we would expect his interpretations to
be aimed at inferring the filmmaker's (or TV producer's)
intended meaning. More specifically, it seems to us a
reasonable assumption that, under these circumstances, the
viewer would treat the elements of the scene before him as
purposeful contributions to the beginning of a story Iine and
interpret them accordingly. (In doing so, he might be
expected to use his knowledge of the conventions of
whatever genre he thinks the movie represents. If, for
instance, he thinks that he is watching a crime drama, he
might try to sort out the people appearing in the tape into
the various kinds of protagonists of a "typical" hold-up
scene.)
We shall refer to the first of the two kinds of
interpretational strategies outlined above (i.e., what the first
hypothetical viewer does) as attribution. The second kind of
strategy we shall call inference. Attribution, then, is the use
of one's knowledge of real Iife in making an interpretation.
Inference is the effort to make an interpretation conform to
one's assumptions about the filmmaker's intention, or, more
precisely, to one's assumption that the event in question was
intended at all -was other than an accidental or haphazard
concatenation of visual events.
The term "attribution" was borrowed from an area of
social psychology (attribution theory) which deals with the
process by which people interpret behavior they observe in
their real-life environment. The correspondence - obviously
not exact-between that process and the one for which we
are using the term should be apparent. The term "inference"
was used to emphasize the fact that, in using this strategy,
the viewer goes beyond the events portrayed, to a central,
all-encompassing, authorial meaning. This terminology,
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together with the theory which it serves, was developed by
Worth and Gross (1974).
To put it briefly, then, this was our hypothesis: The less
control a viewer believes to have gone into the making of a
film, the more he should use "attribution" to interpret it; the
more control, the more he should use "inference." This
hypothesis was tested through the two experiments which we
shall now describe.
In the first experiment, the situation was very similar to
the one described in the hypothetical example above: We
took the same piece of film and showed it to two sets of
viewers. One group of viewers was told that the film had
been made with a hidden camera and that we had picked it
out at random from a large amount of similarly made
footage. The other group of viewers was told that the piece
of film had been clipped out of a longer fiction film which
had been written, directed, and acted by a group of film
students. In other words, there were two experimental
conditions: a minimum-control condition, which we call the
candid condition, and a maximum-control condition, which
we shall call staged.
The til m itself was two minutes long, black-and-white,
silent, in 8mm, and it showed a man sitting in a nondescript
room, fidgeting a little, and, at one point, picking his nose.
There were no cuts in the film. The film was one
uninterrupted length of celluloid. We decided on nosepicking as subject matter because we wanted to present the
viewers with a brief, simple event, which would stand out,
and which we could reasonably expect most viewers to use in
forming judgments of the person in the film.
In the same experiment, we also showed a second film,
which was a variation on the first: In that film, there was a
second person in the frame, with his back to the camera. This
person made talking gestures throughout the length of the
film and did not alter his behavior during the nose-picking.
Both films were shot at the same time, with two cameras, but
in the first one the camera was positioned in such a way as to
exclude the talker. We shall refer to the first film as the alone
film and to the second as the together film. Each film was
shown to two different sets of viewers, corresponding to the
two experimental conditions. In all, therefore, four sets of
viewers were used. Each group comprised about 15 persons,
all of them college students.
After each showing, questionnaires were passed out to the
viewers. These questionnaires asked for a variety of things,
but for present purposes we shall deal with the following
items only. First, each viewer was asked to give five words to
describe the person-or persons-in the film. Second, he or
she was asked to give an explanation for each word. Finally,
each viewer was asked to rate the person(s) in the film on a
set of seven bi-polar adjective scales provided by the
experimenter. These were seven-point scales, and the viewer
had to circle one point of the scale. The adjective pairs were:
(1) refined-vulgar, (2) polite-rude, (3) pleasant-unpleasant,
(4) calm-agitated, (5) friendly-unfriendly, (6) happy-sad, and
(7) intelligent-stupid . Next to each of the scales was a
seven-point "confidence scale," ranging from "not at all
confident" to "completely confident," on which scale each
viewer was to indicate, in a similar fashion, the degree of
confidence with which each judgment had been made. Our
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reasons for soliciting these various response items will
become clear in the discussion of the results, below.
Before we present the results, however, let us briefly
outline how we expected the experiment to turn out. It
should be evident that, broadly speaking, we expected the
viewers in the candid conditions to use an interpretive
strategy of attribution while those in the staged conditions
used a strategy of inference. On a more specific level, we
expected the following to happen.
We expected the most obvious interpretation of the
nose-picking behavior to be that the nose-picker was rude,
vulgar, etc. In the culture of these particular viewers, this is
probably the stereotypical interpretation of nose-picking,
both in real life and in films. However, we expected the
"candid" conditions to result in a variety of other
interpretations as well (e.g., "uninhibited behavior," "casual
life-style," etc.), since we did not believe that-in the eyes of
college students, at least-there would be any necessary
connection between real-life nose-picking and the stereotypical interpretation. Thus, we expected the viewers in the
"candid" conditions to produce, on the average, relatively
moderate judgments of the nose-picker, accompanied by
relatively moderate confidence levels.
In contrast to this situation, viewers in the "staged"
conditions would be confronted with what they believed was
a deliberately staged implication on the part of the
filmmaker. Given this belief, we expected them to be much
more certain that the most obvious, stereotypical interpretation of the nose-picking was to be accepted. Hence, we
expected them to make more extreme •judgments of the
nose-picker-in the direction of "vulgarity," "rudeness,"
etc.-and to be more confident in these judgments.
With these points in mind, we may now examine the
results. We shall be dealing exclusively with data on the
nose-picker. Judgments of the talker in the "candid"
condition were almost identical to those in the "staged"
condition. This was as expected: vie~ers had minimal
information on the talker, regardless of condition. Thus,
their judgments of the talker were uniformly neutral.
To begin with, then, let us examine the results for scale
(1 ), refined-vulgar, and the associated confidence scale (Table
1 ). There are two important points here. (a) For both the
"alone" and the "together" film, the mean rating of the
nose-picker was more extreme (tended toward the vulgar end
of the scale) in the staged condition than in the candid one.
(b) Similarly, confidence levels were higher in the staged
condition for both films. These differences were all
statistically significant. Clearly, these results conform to the
pattern we had expected.
The data for the other bipolar adjective scales (Table 1)
need concern us only very briefly. The results for the
polite-rude scale follow the pattern of those for the
refined-vulgar scale. Note, also, that on the polite-rude scale,
judgments on the "together" film were, in each condition,
more extreme and more confident than those on the "alone"
film. This was a predictable finding, since nose-picking in
public is presumably ruder than nose-picking in private.
Except for the pleasant-unpleasant scale, the rest of the
bipolar adjective scales produced few significant differences
between conditions. This, too, is not a surprising finding:
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TABLE 1
EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN RATINGS AND CONFIDENCE LEVELS

Ratings
Alone

refined (1 )-vulgar(7)
polite(1 )-rude(7)
pleasant(1 )-unpleasant(7)
calm(1 )- agitated(7)
friendly(1 )-unfriendly(7)
happy(1 )-sad (7)
intelligent(1 )-stupid (7)

Together

Candid

Staged

4.1 a
3.88
3.5

5.5a

4.2A

6.0A

5.58
4.2

6.2c

4.5
3.3
3.6

5.0
3.7
3.8
3.3

4.5c
4.1b
4.6

3.4

Candid Staged

3.7

4.9b
4.1
3.8

4.5
3.6

3.8
4.0

Confidence
refined -vulgar
polite-rude
pleasant-unpleasant
calm-agitated
friend Iy - unfriend Iy
happy-sad
intelligent-stupid

3.3c
3.4d
3.3e
4.8

4.8c
4.9d
4.6e
4.9

3.2E
3.5F
3.7

4.6E
5.1 F
3.8

4.70
5.0
4.9
5.3
4.3
4.3
3.7

6.00
6.0
4.8
5.0
4.1
4.3
3.4

*Means sharing a common lower-case subscript differ significantly
at the .05 ,level. Means sharing a common upper-case subscript differ
significantly at the .01 level.

predictably, nose-picking in this situation was less informative with regard to the other adjective pairs.
Let us now turn to the words chosen by the viewers
themselves to describe the nose-picker. We picked out all
those words for which the explanation given was the
nose-picking. We then assigned these words to two
categories: negative judgments ("vulgar," ''rude," etc.) and
neutral or positive judgments ("uninhibited," "natural,"
etc.). 1 Table 2 gives the distribution of these categories by
condition for each film. As one can see, these data for the
most part conform to our expectations. For the "alone"
film, the ratio of unfavorable to other words was 6/9 in the
"candid" condition and 8/4 in the "staged" condition. 1n
other words, viewers in the staged condition were more Iikely
to pick the unfavorable, stereotypical interpretation, as
expected. For the "together" film, we have, again, a high
ratio of unfavorable to other words in the "staged" condition
(21 /2)_ However, the data for the "candid" condition are
puzzling: Only five judgments were based on the
nose-picking (all of them unfavorable), making it hard for us
to compare this condition with the others. We have no

TABLE 2
EXPERIMENT 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NOSE-PICKER

Alone
Candid Staged

Together
Candid Staged

Negative descriptions

6

8

5

21

Neutral/positive descriptions

9

4

0

2

explanation for the low number of words based on
nose-picking in this condition.
Overall, then, the results of the first experiment
conformed to our expectations. For both the "alone" and
the "together" film, the "staged" condition produced more
negative and more confident judgments of the nose-picker
than the "candid" condition. We had expected that this
would occur if viewers in the "candid" conditions tended
toward using attribution and viewers in the "staged"
conditions tended toward using inference. The~efore, the
results of this experiment are consistent with the conclusion
that such was indeed the case. In other words, the results are
consistent with our initial hypothesis: The less control a
viewer assumes to have gone into the making of a film, the
more he will tend to use real-life knowledge to interpret it;
the more control he assumes, the more he should base
interpretations on what he assumes the filmmaker to have
intended, and therefore implied by the very way he
organized his film.
For the second experiment, we prepared a videotape in
which an individual posing as a subject waiting for an
experiment picked his nose either while waiting by himself or
in the presence of another individual. The second experiment
was modelled after the first one, but it was not a
straightforward replication. It differed from the first in three
important ways. First, all subjects, regardless of condition,
observed the nose-picker both alone and in the presence of
another person. Second, the experiment used videotape in
such a way as to try to convince the subjects in the "candid"
conditions that they were watching a "live" event, occurring
at the very moment of observation. Finally, by employing an
open-ended questionnaire and an interview in addition to
rating scales, we tried to get detailed information-lacking in
the first experiment-on the reasons subjects gave for their
judgments of the nose-picker.
As with the first experiment, two tapes were made. Both
tapes contained sound. Although neither tape contained any
edits, each tape can be divided into four sections. The first
and fourth sections, each approximately five minutes in
length, contained a shot of an empty waiting room. Only
viewers in the candid conditions saw these two sections. The
second section of the tape begins with a "secretary" showing
the nose-picker into the room and asking him to wait until
"they" are ready. The nose-picker sits down to wait, briefly
looks around the room, begins shuffling through some
magazines on a table in front of him, and finally selects two
to leaf through. This section, lasting approximately a minute
and a half, is termed the "alone" section. The third section,
the "together" section, begins with the same secretary
showing a second person into the room and asking him to
wait. (In the tape condition, this person was supposed to be a
"fellow-subject," waiting for the fictional "experimenters"
to show up. In the real life condition, this person was the
administrator of the experiment we are describing.) After
trading "hellos," the second person (referred to, from now
on, as the experimenter) sits down to wait, and the
nose-picker returns to his magazine. After shuffling through
some magazines, the experimenter m1t1ates a casual
conversation with the nose-picker. The conversation lasts
until the secretary reenters about five minutes later and asks
both to follow her out of the room. The two tapes differ
ATTRIBUTION AND INFERENCE
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with regard to the point at which the nose-picker picks his
nose. In the tape shown in the alone conditions, the
nose-picker picks his nose while waiting by himself. In the
tape used in the together conditions, nose-picking occurs
about half-way through the conversation, while the
experimenter is talking.
Forty paid volunteers served as viewers, 10 in each of the
four conditions. All were university students and participated
in the experiment either alone (20) or in pairs (20). Viewers
were told one of two cover stories.
In the candid conditions, viewers were led into an
observation room containing a television monitor that was
already screening the first section of the tape, a shot of an
empty room. The monitor was hooked up to a VTR
(videotape recorder) situated in an adjacent office, but the
viewers were led to believe that they were witnessing a live
monitor. The experimenter announced that several researchers (unidentified) had become interested in the effects
on character and personality judgments of viewing people via
television; that another subject, whom he did not know, had
been scheduled for the same time but would be shown into
the waiting room appearing on the monitor; that there was a
closed-circuit television system hooked up between that
room and the observation room; and that the camera was
hidden and the room rigged for sound. The experimenter
then told candid-condition viewers that when the unsuspecting person (the nose-picker) was shown into the
waiting room, he (the experimenter) would leave and be
"shown" into the room, where he would pretend to be a
fellow-subject, waiting for the experiment. After about five
minutes, he would return to the observation room, where
both he and the observing subjects would fill out a
questionnaire on their impressions of the waiting individual.
A short interview to help the research group structure a more
formal experiment would follow the questionnaire.
In the staged conditions, the VTR was in the same room
as the monitor. It was turned off when the subjects entered
but preset for the beginnjng of the second section (alone) of
the tape. The experimenter wore different clothes from those
used in the taping . The experimenter told viewers that he was
finishing a television lab in which he had written and direct ed
a film and that, as part of the course requirements, he had
cut the film into segments of different sizes and was
screening them to groups of students, the purpose being to
discover how judgments would change depend ing on the
segment viewed. Viewers would watch one of the segments
and then fill out a questionnaire and participate in an
int erview.
As with the first experiment, then, there were four
conditions in this second experiment: (1) alone-candid, (2)
alone-staged, (3) together-candid, (4) together-staged. Viewers in each condition made judgments about the nose-picker
on 13 bipolar adjective scales similar to those used in the first
experiment. Likewise, a seven -point confidence scale was
appended to each rating scale. Of the 13 rating scales, six
were cons idered critical to this experiment : refined-vulgar,
polite-rude, pleasant-unpleasant, calm-agitated, friendlyunfriendly, warm -cold . The remaining scales were fillers . As
expected, there were no significant diffe rences between any
conditions in judgm ents made on the fi lle r rating scales . Our
discussion will focus o n th e c ritical scales and t he statements
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viewers made about them. How did we expect subjects in
each of the four conditions to judge the nose-picker on the
six critical scales?
We expected that judgments by alone-candid viewers
would be determined by two factors. As with the first
experiment, we expected the private, "candid" nose-picking
to be relatively uninformative, on the average. In fact, during
the interviews, only four of the 10 alone-candid viewers gave
nose-picking as a reason for making any judgment about the
nose-picker. Furthermore, since the nose-picker was dressed
attractively and engaged in a pleasant conversation with the
experimenter, alone-candid viewers would see him as "acting
naturally" and as a ''nice guy.'' They would make positive,
although not necessarily very confident, judgments about
him.
In the together-candid condition, on the other hand, the
contradiction presented by a conservatively dressed student
pleasantly engaged in a conversation while picking his nose
would preclude the lumping together of positive judgments
across several scales under a broad personality description
("nice guy"). Together-candid viewers would have to pay
closer attention to each particular rating scale and to the
subtleties of the nose-picker's behavior. Judgments and
confidence levels on each critical scale would vary depending
on the type and number of reasons which viewers could
observe in assessing the nose-picker's traits.
The judgments of viewers in staged conditions would, we
believed, be determined by their assumption of the
filmmaker's control over the film. Most of us tend to believe
that a filmmaker is responsible for what happens within his
film; the determination of his intentions and the meaning of
his film depend upon this accountability. For the
alone-staged viewers then, the nose-picking would be
assumed to be intentional and, therefore , relatively more
communicatively meaningful than for the alone-candid
viewers . In contrast to the alone-candid viewers, seven of the
10 alone-staged viewers gave nose-picking as a reason for
making judgments about the nose-picker as a character
(distinguished, of course, from the real-life person who was,
rather than was portraying, a nose-picker) . Since alone-staged
viewers would be assessing the nose-picking as a symbolic
event, they would treat it with confidence as implying
something negative about the nose-picker.
Similarly, we expected that together-staged viewers would
make negative judgments about the nose-picker. Unlike
viewers in the together-candid condition, who would try to
estimate the nose-picker's position on each scale, togetherstaged viewers would treat the nose-picking as a clear
implication by the filmmaker that the nose-picker was not a
nice person . Consequently, judgments by together-staged
viewers would be very confident.
In Table 3 we have lumped the six critical scales together
to give a general overview of the distribution of viewers'
judgments in each condition. The scales may be treated as
running from extreme positive judgments (1) to extreme
negative judgments (7).
Table 3 indicates that the pattern of judgments by viewers
in each condition generally-but not entirely-confirmed our
expectations. The majority of judgments by alone-candid
viewers were positive. A large number of judgments by
alone-staged viewers were negative, but not extreme.
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Together-candid viewers made fewer extreme, pos1t1ve
judgments and more negative ones than alone-candid viewers.
In the together-staged condition, judgments tended to be
very extreme; however, the distribution of judgments is
bimodal. We shall return to this bimodality a little later.
TABLE 3
EXPERIMENT 2: DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGMENTS *

Alone
Candid Staged

Together
Candid Staged

1 {+)

14

8

5

8

2

16

7

21

16

3

16

10

10

4

4

8

11

10

4

5

5

15

5

8

6

7

5

15

7 {-)

2

4

5

3.8

3.3

3.7

TABLE 4:
EXPERIMENT 2: MEAN RATINGS AND CONFIDENCE LEVELS*

Ratings
Alone
Together
Candid Staged
Candid Staged
refined (1 )-vulgar(7)
polite(1 )-rude(7)
pleasant{1 )-unpleasant(7)
calm(1 )-agitated(7)
friendly(1 )-unfriendly(7)
warm{1 )-cold{7)

2.6

*"Positive" judgments {+)are represented by lower numbers {1 to
3); "negative" judgments{-) by higher numbers {5 to 7).

Table 4 gives the mean rating levels for each of the six
critical scales by condition and supports the distribution data
shown in Table 3. Judgments by alone-candid viewers are
extremely positive. Alone-staged viewers are negative or
neutral in their judgments. The exception is the polite-rude
scale (mean=2.1) where alone-staged viewers found specific
reasons (e.g., "He didn't pick his nose while you were with
him"; "He kept the conversation going when he didn't have
to") for making judgments on this scale. Together-candid
viewers are less positive than alone-candid viewers, but are
clearly negative only on the refined-vulgar scale (mean=4.7).
Judgments by together-staged viewers, while somewhat
negative, tend to hover about the mid-point of each scale.
Given Table 3, however, this can be seen as resulting from
the bimodal distribution of judgments. Significance tests
-reveal a general candid-staged main effect across the critical
scales, with the exception of the polite-rude scale and the
refined-vulgar scale.
Table 4 also shows the mean confidence levels for each
rating scale by condition. The most surprising finding is that
subjects in all four conditions were able to make highly
confident judgments. In no case were confidence levels in the
lower half of the seven-point continuum. Among the four
conditions, the high confidence of alone-candid viewers is the
most puzzling. Here, it is interesting to note that in the
alone-candid condition mean confidence levels on critical
scales averaged 1.5 points higher than mean confidence levels
on filler scales. (A similar pattern was found for the other
conditions.) The high confidence displayed by alone-candid
viewers on critical scales can, perhaps, be best understood by
taking two factors into consideration. First, it may be that
judgments on the critical scales could be based-partially, at
least-on the nature of the situation (i.e., a waiting room in
which a certain typical range of behavior may confidently be

4.5
2.1

2.0a
2.8b

3.4a
4.8b

1.8A
3.5c

3.4A
4.5c

4.7
2.9
2.9
3.6
2.8
3.5

4.1
3.6
3.4
4.5
3.4
4.3

Confidence
refined -vulgar
polite-rude
pleasant-unpleasant
calm-agitated
friendly-unfriendly
warm-cold

Mean =

3.8
1.9

4.9
5.8
5.8
5.0
5.6
4.2

5.4
6.2

5.9
6.2

5.2
6.2

5.9
5.6
5.3
5.2

6.2
5.8
6.2
5.5

6.3
5.3
6.6
5.6

*Means sharing a common lower-case subscript differ significantly
at the .05 level. Means sharing a common upper-case subscript differ
significantly at the .01 level.

expected) rather than on the actual behavior of the
participants in the situation. Second, alone-candid viewers
made statements to the effect that the nose-picker was acting
"naturally," etc. Given these factors, gross behavioral events
(e.g., keeping the conversation going) may have been
sufficiently rei iable indicators of general traits to allow for
confident judgments. When the high confidence of
alone-candid viewers is taken into consideration, it is not
surprising to find a general lack of numerically significant
findings in Table 4. The table must be interpreted in terms of
general trends.
With this in mind, Table 4 tends to confirm our
expectations. Judgments by alone-staged viewers tend to be
somewhat more confident than judgments by alone-candid
viewers; and judgments by together-staged viewers tend to be
somewhat more confident than judgments by alone-staged
viewers. The various confidence scales for together-candid
viewers, however, are difficult to interpret, for we had
expected that confidence in this condition would vary with
extremity of judgment. Extreme negative or positive
judgments would be very confident due to careful attention
to the nose-picker's behavior, while lower confidence levels
would be associated with neutral responses. Table 4 indicates
that together-candid viewers showed relatively Iittle variation
in confidence levels.
In general, the together-candid condition produced results
which we cannot entirely account for. We have pointed out
that in this experiment's together-candid condition,
nose-picking conflicted with the positive attributes of the
nose-picker's dress and conversation. As we had expected,
this discrepancy elicited from the viewers closer attention to
the more subtle details of the nose-picker's behavior (e.g.,
ATTRIBUTION AND INFERENCE
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"His voice tended to drop off at the end of his sentences";
"His answers came too quickly after your questions").
Contrary, however, to our expectations-or, at least, to our
design-some of the together-candid viewers resolved this
discrepancy by doubting the "candidness" of the
nose-picking (although not necessarily the truthfulness of the
experimenter; the possibility was brought up that he too was
being duped by the higher authorities for whom the study
was being performed). Of the eight viewers who reported
that they had observed the nose-picking, six said that they
believed that it might have been staged rather than candid.
Each of these six had previously participated in at least one
psychology experiment; four had been in three or more.
Moreover, five of these six viewers reported that, in spite of
their doubts about the candid nature of the event they were
witnessing, they attempted to treat it as though it were real.
They pretended that the waiting-room situation was candid,
even though their prior experience suggested that it wasn't.
Our interviews with together-candid viewers, however,
indicated that the effects of doubt and pretending upon
judgments were not uniform. For some viewers, a rating scale
was treated as an implication on the part of the
experimenters and interpreted in a way similar to that used
by together-staged viewers. Other viewers saw or pretended
to see the same scale in terms of the nose-picker's "natural"
personality. And, finally, some viewers saw the implications
of the experimenters as "masking" the nose-picker's true
character and either sought out more confirming or
disconfirming information in his behavior or simply rated the
nose-picker opposite to the inferred implication. Thus, the
together-candid condition failed to provide us with the
information for which it had been intended, i.e., how viewers
who believed in the candidness of the taped situation would
interpret it. However, th'e results of this condition were not
without interest within the context of our overall scheme, as
we hope to show in the course of the following discussion of
the together-staged condition.
We have already noted (Tables 3 and 4) that the
distribution of judgments by together-staged subjects was
bimodal. What could account for this? As part of the
interview, we obtained from all viewers information on
whether they had observed the nose-picking, whether they
had thought it noteworthy , and how they had used it in
making judgments. In the staged -together condition , six
viewers reported having observed the nose-picking and used it
in explaining their judgments; one viewer reported having
observed it but not having considered it noteworthy; and
three viewers reported that they were not sure the
nose-picker had picked his nose. It is this 6-4 split between
users and nonusers of the nose-picking as judgmental
evidence which appears to account for the bimodality
observed in the distributions in the staged-together
condition.
In pursuing this interpretation, we computed the mean
rating levels for the six using and fou r nonusing viewers on
each critical scale. These n umbers confirm the explanation
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given above for the biomodality. On each scale, viewers who
did use the nose-picking made negative judgments about the
nose-picker, while those who did not made positive
judgments.
The consequence of using vs. not using the nose-picking in
making a judgment of the nose-picker was probably
predictable. What is of interest in this condition is that so
many viewers (four out of 10) did not attend to the
nose-picking. We interpret this result to be illustrative of the
difference which "staging" makes to a perceiver's attention
to and interpretation of a scene.
As Birdwhistell (1970:151) has pointed out, one of the
ways in which fictional conversations (not only in movies but
also in literature, the theater, and comic books) depart from
reality is in the regularity and orderliness of turn-taking: with
relatively rare exceptions, conventional fictional speakers
exchange lines without interruption and the focus of the
encounter shifts back and forth from one speaker to another
in concert with this exchange. This is perhaps most nicely
illustrated when a fictional conversation is filmed in a
two-shot and the camera's focus literally shifts back and
forth between two speakers in a single frame. All this is quite
contrary to many real-1 ife conversational situations, in which
speakers' Iines overlap or interrupt each other and, even in
the absence of verbal synchrony, the meaning of an
encounter is nevertheless located not in a single participant
(the "speaker") but in an interaction in which all participants
are continuously engaged. Given this state of affairs, it is also
reasonable to assume that an observer of a fictional
("staged") conversation applies different rules to this
observation from those which he would apply to the
observation of a real-life conversation. Specifically, we want
to suggest that, when in the presence of a staged
conversation, the typical viewer has learned to shift his
attention from one Character to another in conjunction with
the exchange of spoken Iines; whereas, when confronted with
a real -life conversation, the observer cannot as easily
disregard the (non-verbal) contribution of a non-speaker to
the ongoing event. In terms of this experiment, then, we
might say that the viewers in the together-candid condition
had to pay attention to both "speaker" and "listener,"
whereas those in the together-staged condition could
selectively focus their attention on the "speaker" alone.
Since the nose-picking occurred when the nose-picker was
acting as listener, this interpretation would account for the
relatively high number of viewers who "missed" the
nose-picking in the together-staged condition. It should also
be noted, however, that together-candid viewers had an
additional reason for paying attention to the nose-picker
even when he was not speaking; they had been asked to
assess his personality. (Finally, we should also repeat that, in
the first experiment, the "talker" was filmed with his back to
the camera, thus directing attention to the "nose-picker" at
all times and vitiating the comparability of the two
experiments in this respect. The reader should also recall that
the film used in the first experiment was silent.)
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If this interpretation of our results in the together-staged
condition is accepted, then it would appear that the second
experiment, too, confirms our expectations about the
differences between what Worth & Gross have called
"attributional" and "inferential" interpretational strategies
(with due regard, of course, for the problematic results in the
second experiment's together-candid condition).
To recapitulate, then: Those aspects of a film or videotape
which a viewer assumes to be free of control (or authorial
purpose) will be interpreted according to interpretational
rules appropriate to the corresponding real-life event (i.e., he
will use the interpretational strategy of attribution). On the
other hand, those symbolic events which he assumes to have
been staged will be interpreted according to what he assesses
as the producer's intent (i.e., he will use inference).
Several observations need to be added to the above
explication of our experiments. In the experiments we have
just described, we were concerned mainly with the
polarization and confidence of interpretations. This should
not be taken to mean that we believe such extreme
interpretations and the confidence with which they were
made to be the most important, most frequent, or most
typical aspects in which interpretations vary according to
perceived degree of control. Our argument in this respect was
specific to the films we used and the kinds of viewers who
saw them. A different kind of film might have elicited other
kinds of differences. All we wanted to show was that, at least
in some cases, perceived degree of control does make a
difference to the final outcome of the interpretation and that
this difference stems from the use of different
interpretational strategies (attribution vs . inference).
The "significant event" in our experimental films-a
character's action (i.e., the nose-picking)-represents only
one of the many ways in which meaning can be built into a
film. We have said nothing in this paper about editing,
camera angles, choice of lenses, etc., although it is on these
aspects of film, treated as signs of what to attend to, that
most film theorists have concentrated. However, some recent
film research has gone in the direction of dealing with the
characters' actions, motions, positioning, etc. Some
investigators have become exasperated with the long and
generally unproductive search for linguistic-like units of the
order of editing (and other such essentially "framing"
devices) and are now turning their attention toward the
actual events within the temporal or spatial "frame." For
example, Bettetini (1973:55) suggests that it may be time to
begin borrowing from kinesics and proxemics for the analysis
of film. The results of our experiments would suggest the
following: Possible similarities between fiction-film events
and real -life events on the articulatory level are not to be
taken as evidence for a similarity on the level of meaning. In
other words, the uncritical application of the findings-as
distinct from the methods-of kinesics, proxemics, etc., to
fiction fi Im may Iead to error. There is another side to the
above observation. Some investigators of the communicational aspects of body motion have traditionally used

obviously staged films (and posed photographs) with their
informants. The implicit assumption behind this kind of
work seems to be that the informants' interpretation of the
staged material is identical to what it would be if they were
confronted with the corresponding real-life event. This, of
course, is the assumption whose fallacy we have tried to
show in this study. By using staged material in their research,
investigators are ending up with detailed information on the
meaning of acted facial expressions, gestures, etc., but
questionable evidence on the communicational patterning of
body motion in real life. 2 Naturally, there are nuances with
which the attribution-inference distinction-as presented
here-does not deal. We would be the first to acknowledge
that these nuances are lost in our data, in part because of the
quantitative form of the bulk of these data. For example, it
may well be that a given viewer's beliefs about some aspects
of real-life behavior are actually the product of familiarity
with supposedly realistic fictional portrayals of that kind of
behavior (on TV or in movies). To the extent that this is
true, the viewer's use of attribution as an interpretive
strategy may unconsciously involve reliance on fictional
codes, conventions or stereotypes of behavior.
Conversely, since fiction films rarely deliberately proclaim ·
their artificiality-indeed, they usually purport to be realistic
representations-we cannot assume that a viewer will always
maintain an awareness of the "stagedness" of that which he
is watching. In the experiments we desOfibed, the brevity
(and the pedestrian quality) of the films we used made it
difficult for the viewer to forget the explicit introductory
information as to the nature ("candid" vs. "staged") of the ·
films. But with a feature-length fiction film, in which
exciting or moving things may happen, whatever detachment
a viewer may have started out with can frequently give way
to an illusion of reality or to a so-called suspension of
disbelief. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to
assume that "attributions" may coexist with "inferences" in
a particular viewer's interpretations of a specific film.
In general then, what seems to have been clarified by
these experiments is our understanding that viewers of filmed
events do not use the same strategies when interpreting
symbolic events which they have assumed to be real that
they use to interpret events which they assume to be acted or
contrived. Further we have shown that it is the amount of
control that the viewers assume to have been exerted in the
production of the event which determines in large part the
strategy used in its interpretation. This is not only of
importance in helping us to understand how we deal with our
fictional and real worlds when seen on film in a context of
"narrative," "news," or "documentary," but also is
important in helping us clarify how we may interpret
"scientific" footage of human behavior in field, classroom,
and experimental conditions. The assumptions we make
about the behavior of the producer of a symbolic event play
at least as great a part as the assumptions we make about the
behavior of the "actors" in "real" or "symbolic" worlds. It
might even be said that these assumptions help us to
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determine which
"symbolic."

events we want to label

"real" or

rude, impolite, vulgar, rude, rude annoying; neutral/positve words·:
normal, frank.
2
This is one of the points made by Birdwhistell (1970 : 153-155)
and Mead (1975) in discussions of this type of research.
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